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CASES NOTED

of the consortium, other than that of material services, are injured in negligent invasions, nevertheless on one or more of several grounds have denied
recovery to the wife.," None of these grounds have any real validity. Still
other equally untenable grounds have been relied on by some courts 16 in
these actions. The utter inconsistency of the courts is manifested by the
position taken that the wife may recover for an intentional or so-called
malicious injury to the consortium, 17 but may not recover for an identical
injury caused by negligence. There is no good reason for allowing relief
for an injury to a legally protected interest in the one case while denying it in
the other, but courts have attempted to rationalize this departure from
proper legal principles by an argument which is elementarily unsound.18
It may be too optimistic to hope that stare decisis will give way in the
face of this court's exhaustive, albeit devastating, treatment of the universal
rule and the policy behind it. Yet it is much to be desired that the prevailing view be discarded, since there is neither logic nor fairness to support
it. Certainly other jurisdictions conceivably could profit by an awareness
of an historic decision delivered by a court unafraid of its duty to dispense
justice. The language of this court' may well be regarded as an important
legal guidepost: ". . . we are not unaware of the unanimity of authority
elsewhere denying the wife recovery under these circumstances . . . after

piercing the thin veils of reasoning employed to sustain the rule, we have
been unable to disclose any substantial rationale on which we would be
willing to predicate a denial of a wife's action for loss of consortium due
to a negligent injury to her husband."

FEDERAL COURTS - EFFECT OF STATE
DECISIONS IN NON-DIVERSITY CASES
Action was started in the federal court to recover the balance due a
widow from National Service Life Insurance covering deceased. Recovery
depended on a determination of whether claimant was the legal widow of
the deceased. Claimant-wife and deceased were divorced from their former
15. Wife's injury not direct, McDade v. West, 80 Ga.App. 481, 56 S.E.2d 299
1949); Brown v. Kistleman, supra note 14; Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y.
upp. 459 (Sup.Ct. 1900); Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., 81 Ore. 517,
160 Pac. 132 (1916). Wife's injuries too remote and consequential, Gambino v. Mfgrs'.
Coal & Coke Co., supra note 11; Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry. supra note 1I. No recovery allowed at common law for sentimental elements of consortium, Feneff v. N.Y.
Cent. & H. R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909). Wife cannot show loss of services,
Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, sujna note 14; Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101
112 N.E. 204 (1915).
16. Wife's interest in marital relation not a property right, Brown v. Kistleman,
supra note 14; Goldman v. Cohen, supra note 15.
17. See supra, notes 6, 7, 8.
18. Wife's action allowed to punish defendant, Brown v. Kistleman, supra note 14;
Goldman v. Cohen, supra note 15; Kosciolek v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., supra
note 15. If cause of action based entirely on punitive damages, action fails, McCoRMIcKC,
DAMAGES, § 83, (1935).
19. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
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spouses under decrees prohibiting remarriage without the consent of court
during the life of the former spouse. Without such consent, claimant and
deceased were subsequently married in another state in which they contintied to live until the death of the husband in military service. The court
looked to the laws of the state where claimant and deceased were married,
and discovered a single inferior state court reported decision which held
such a marriage invalid. Held, that there was a valid marriage and the
claimant may recover. In the absence of a state supreme court ruling, federal
courts may differ with lower state court interpretations and decide according
to their own criteria.' Lembcke v. United States, 181 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.
1950).
When federal court jurisdiction rests on diversity of citizenship, the
federal courts follow state supreme court rulings of substantive law as a result of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 2 This procedure is followed because the
power of the state to determine its substantive law necessarily infers the
prerogative to prescribe its extent and limitations. 3 Where the cases are
concerned with unsettled state law, federal courts formulate the law from
available data. 4 One case 5 has gone so far as to hold that when a state
supreme court decision is lacking, and federal courts are convinced the state
supreme court would decide otherwise," they must depart from inferior
state court decisions. This is so notwithstanding a decision of the United
States Supreme Court which does in fact follow a lower state court de7
cision.
While matters of substantive law in diversity problems are ruled by the
Erie case so that federal courts adhere to the principal of conformity with
state rulings, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures were made to create
uniformity in federal procedural law. Despite the dichotomy of conformity
and uniformity, judicial determination of "substance" and "procedure" were
1. MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 119 F.2d 148 (6th Cir. 1941), af'd,
315 U.S. 280 (1944); Huss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 37 F.Supp. 364 (D. Conn.

1941).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).

3. Note, 48 Cot. L. REv. 575 (1948).
4. See Wilmington Trust Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 68 F. Supp. 83 (D.
Del. 1946), MacGregor v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., supra note 1.
5. 320 U.S. 228 (1943). Other limitations are imposed when federally protected
rights are affected. Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (U.S. 1869). Where the
state tribunal has applied the leax fori instead of the foreign rule so that conspicuous error
results, federal courts insist on the application of the foreign rule. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947); John Hancock Ins. Co.
v. Yates, 229 U.S. 178 (1936); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914).
6. West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Cooper v. American
Airlines, Inc., 149 l.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1945).
7. Huss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 37 F. Supp. 364 (D. Conn. 1941) (only
case).
8. 62 STAT. 961, c. 646 (1948), amended 63 STAT. 104, c. 139, § 103, 63 STAT.
446, c. 343, § 2 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (Supp. 1950). Some Rules specifically
apply state law. FaD. R. oF Civ. P 17(b), 62(f), 64. In determining what the state
law is under these sections of the Rules, the courts follow Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, supra
note 1.
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abandoned as a test for determining the application of Erie priciples. 9 In
their place was put the standard of whether the result of the litigation is
affected if the federal court disregards the substantive law in favor of federal
procedural law.'0 If a conflict is found then state law is applied." It would
seem then that conformity in substantive law and uniformity in procedural
law are principles that hold no guide for the litigant and the jurist, and that
the principle of conformity in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins is extended to procedural matters in diversity cases.
In non-diversity problems, the Supreme Court to date has not expressly
extended nor refused to extend the Erie doctrine so as to include subordinate
questions of state law.1" Rather, the court has said that the Erie case does
not apply where rights arc created or protected by federal law or involves
federal policies, however persuasive the state law or decision may be.a Erie
does not apply because the evils which it was to rectify, that of transgressing
the state power to prescribe and limit its own substantive law, are not
present. This doctrine has been rciterated' 4 except when the court felt
itself bound to follow state laws on questions incidental, preliminary or
collateral to the federal questions involved.' The basis for these exceptions
has not been expressed, the courts bing content to say that they were bound
by the state decisions. This development of conformity with state law in
non-diversity cases has generally been with reference to procedural matters,
and to the degree that there is conformity the concept of the Erie doctrine
has been extended to non-diversity cases. It has been extended impliedly
by the courts' 6 through the application of a diversity case ruling 7 that
federal courts are bound to speculate as to the state supreme court's position
in a field of unsettled law. Congress has expressly extended the principle
of conformity by requiring the determination of state law in certain procedural matters in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 8 Court application
of these Rules' 9 have been based on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins."'
The present case, as well as a similar National Life hIsurance case,2"
9. York v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 326 U.S. 99 (1945).

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.
12. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946); see D'Oench, Duhme & Co, v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 467 (1941) (concurring opinion).
13. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif.,. 332 U.S. 301 (1947); Holmberg
v. Armrbrechlt, supra note 12.
14. Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949); Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556
(1941); Higginbotham v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535 (1939); Commercial Credit Co. v.
Davidson, 112 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1940); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Miami, 98 F.2d
180 (5th Cir. 1938).
15. Conway v. Bonner, 100 F,2d 786 (5th Cir. 1939); Dysart v. United States,
95 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1938).
16. United States v. Layton, 68 F. Supp. 247 (S.D. Fla. 1946).
17. Meredith v. Winterhaven, supra note 5.
18. Huss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, supra note 7.
19. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co. v. Local Union No. 2928, 152 F.2d 493 (7th
Cir. 1945).
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
21. Schurink v. United States, 177 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1949).
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evidences further extension of Erie R.v.
Tompkins into non-diversity
cases. The court found it necessary to look to the substantive law of the
state in order to determine a question preliminary to the ultimate federal
question. Whether to follow an inferior state court decision, was resolved
in the negative by departing from the lower state court decision because the
court in the instant case was convinced the state supreme court would hold
contra. This departure was prompted only by a "belief" that the federal
courts have the freedom in non-diversity cases to differ with an inferior
state court. This reasoning is the one used in diversity cases with unsettled
state law, 23 though the court does not recognize the parallel in as many
words.
POST OFFICE-DISCRIMINATION IN POSTAL SERVICE
FOUND WHERE SERVICE CUT IN ONLY ONE OF
TWO CONTIGUOUS COMMUNITIES
Pursuant to a directive of the Postmaster General ordering nationwide
reduction of postal service, a postmaster of two contiguous communities
cut deliveries to the business district of one, while not disturbing those in
the other. Plaintiff, a businessman in the district whose deliveries were
cut, sought a temporary and permanent restraining order to compel the
postmaster to continue the same mail delivery service to plaintiff as plaintiff
had received prior to the issuance of the Postmaster General's directive.
Held, injunction issuing, that there must be no discrimination in postal
service between business districts of the two communities served by defendant's post office. Fite v. Payne, 91 F. Supp. 896 (N.D.Tex. 1950).
The power of Congress to establish the postal system' includes the
regulation of the entire postal system, 2 all powers necessary to make the
grant effective, 3 and all measures necessary to secure the safe, speedy and
prompt delivery and transmission of the mails.4 Since the Constitution
does not guarantee unrestricted use of the mails,5 the mere establishment of
the postal system does not automatically confer rights upon individuals to
7
receive its services free from either statutory restraints or discrimination.
Congress delegates to the Postmaster General power to make regula22. 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
23. Cooper v. American Airlines, Inc., supra note 6; MacGregor v. State Mut. Life
Assur. Co., sutra note 1; Huss v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, spra note 7; West v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., supra note 6.
1. U. S. CONsT. Art. I, § 8, ci. 7.
2. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (18771.
3. Ex parte Rapier, 143 U.S. 110 (1892).
4. United States v. Musgrave, 160 Fed. 700 (E.D. Ark. 1908).
5.Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718 (Sth Cir. 1910).
6. Cf. Acret v. Harwood, 41 F.Supp. 492 (S.D. Cal. 1941),
7. Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913)(Congress was permitted,
in furtherance of the dissemination of knowledge, to so legislate as to favor publications,
though this intrinsically discriminated against the general public).

